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Re-Configuring Security Practices:  
The Power of the Private Security Business 
 
 
Since the end of the Cold War the private security has become a lucrative, fast growing business 
(Singer, 2003).1 At the outset, this passed largely unnoticed. This is no longer the case. The be-
heading of Blackwater employees in Fallujah, the participation of CACI and Titan in the Abu 
Ghraib interrogations and the close relations between vice president Dick Cheney and “the in-
dustry” are just some of the reasons the industry has made it into the media and hence into public 
debate. Many companies are now household names. The private security industry is literally 
fashionable as Paris stores now carry Blackwater gear (West, 2006). There is nonetheless a strik-
ing contrast between the seeming omni-presence of the security business in public debate and the 
judgements made about its influence and hence power. As the editor of this special issue puts it, 
the question is how numbers translate into power (Fuchs, in this issue). Among specialists of In-
ternational Relations (IR), the consensus has been that numbers do not translate into power – at 
least when we talk about the private security business. The private security business is just pro-
viding services to states (e.g. Shearer, 1998). The authority to decide where, how and by whom 
these services can be used rests with states. Because the use of force is pivotal for the way many 
IR scholars think of their field, the absence of private authority over the use of force becomes an 
indication of the limited significance of private power more generally. Business power in secu-
rity and by inference in international politics in general is in other words not important. It is all 
numbers and no power. 
 This article takes issue with this position. It does not contest the claim that the monopoly 
over the legitimate use of force continues to rest with states. Instead it argues that the “power” of 
the private security business resides in altering what is actually done in security as well as the 
way it is done; the power of the private security business resides in its refashioning of security 
practices.2 This impact eludes those who identify power with the capacity to get someone to do 
something they would not otherwise have done. Firms may not be able to persuade states (or 
                                                          
1 Much ink has been used delimiting the private security business from the private military business. In this paper, 
the term private security business is used to refer to firms who are directly involved in the use of force abroad. I do 
not refer to Private Military Companies because the bulk of the firms themselves (after marketing the term) have 
now abandoned it because of the lack of legitimacy of private military activities in international politics. They have 
therefore reverted to terming themselves private security companies. For further discussions about definitional is-
sues see e.g. Isenberg (2004: p. 15), Singer (2003: Chaps 1-4).  
2 The theoretical reference literature signaled by the reference to practices is the literature on “practices” both from 
a Foucauldian and from a Bourdieu inspired perspectives (Larner and Walters, 2004 and Wacquant, 2005).  
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anyone else) to change their security policies. The power of the private security business is to 
alter what people, organizations and states do, without being bullied into doing it, i.e. how they 
deal with security on their own initiative. This is an impersonal, diffuse and generalised form of 
power. It systematically advantages some private security firms as well as private security pro-
viders as a group.3 However, this article is less concerned with the effects the changing security 
practices have than with the changes themselves. Exploring the reconfiguration of security prac-
tices is not only logically prior to asking questions about how changing security practices affect 
the relative strength of firms and states. It is also an attempt to capture shifts in the overall shape 
of the forest rather than at the fate of individual trees. The argument in this article is that the pri-
vate security business is refashioning the “forest” through its impact on security practices. This 
would seem an incontestably important form of power. 
 Specifically the article argues that the exponential growth of the security business has led 
to a technocratization and depoliticization of security practices including the practices of states. 
In order to trace this transformation, the article relies on the self-understanding of the private se-
curity business, that is on the image firm representatives and lobby organizations present of their 
activities. The article attributes the reconfiguration of security practices to the fact that the busi-
ness mostly does what it constantly says it does – namely provide market based security services, 
keep out of politics and work with states and not against them. This may sound rather too obvi-
ous. But paradoxically it is not. Those interested in private security business power tend to as-
sume that the business’ self-representation is intended to deceive and mask power. They there-
fore neglect what is (at least if the argument in this article is right) the most direct way of grasp-
ing the private business power in the security sector. 
 
 
2. Efficient Experts and Techno-Managerial Security Practices 
 
The private security business is like any other private businesses at least if we are to believe 
managers of the sector or assorted lobby groups such as the Business Executives for National 
Security (BENS), the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), or the British Security 
Industry Association (BSIA).4 Security firms they insist compete with each other for contracts by 
trying to offer the best product/service at the most attractive price. To do this, they need to attract 
competent staff. Moreover, as in any other business, firms specialize in specific market segments 
and bolster their operations by vertical (into corporate hierarchies) and horizontal (between mar-
kets) market integration strategies. Third, as in any other market, firms engage in marketing, 
branding and advertising as well as in lobbying aimed at reshaping the regulatory environment. 
Finally, as in other economic sectors, the state and state sponsored regulation plays a central 
role. This does not imply that there is no market. Moreover, as in other markets some firms and 
individuals break the norms and laws of regulation which obviously does not mean that 
laws/norms are absent. The private security business on its own account is, to be clear, a private 
business sector. The sector has its own admitted idiosyncrasies but logically and morally it does 
not fundamentally differ from many other private business sectors. This image will not be con-
tested here (although it could be). Instead, the question is what this “normal” business behaviour 
                                                          
3 A comparison of the gains and losses is provided in Leander (2006). 
4  The organizations have websites stating this view. For a specific example see the statement by the IPOA  presi-
dent (Brooks, 2005). 
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entails for security practices: what does it mean for security practices when the number of firms 
selling price effective solutions to security problems in a market expands rapidly?  
 A first step towards answering that question is to underline that the private security busi-
ness tends to focus on the technical and the managerial aspects of security. The reason is that pri-
vate security firms aim to provide technically competent professional solutions to security prob-
lems. This logically pushes them to stress the centrality of professionalism and technical capaci-
ties. The way they do this obviously varies greatly. Some may work from a very specific compe-
tence (for example operating a specific Information Technology system) for others it may be far 
more general (for example providing competent guard services for investors in conflict con-
texts). Many firms stress their possibility to draw on a specialised staff for specific contracts to 
argue that this places them at the top of technical requirements in any specific field. Characteris-
tically Dyncorp (one of the bigger US firms) explains on its website that “maintaining security is 
a global problem, but individual security needs are unique. Our flexible, integrated approach pro-
vides extensive technology and personal security solutions to protect people, facilities, and in-
formation.” Similarly, Ed Soyster speaking about his firm Military Professional Resources 
(MPRI) underscores its competence by claiming that it has “more generals than the Pentagon” on 
its staff lists (quoted in Mandel, 2002: p. 112). Firm in the sector tends to emphasise profession-
alism and technical competence and many add their flexibility to tailor their service to specific 
tasks. 
 When firms compete for contracts, the emphasis on technical expertise and professional 
competence is logically paired with an emphasis on cost effectiveness. Potential clients care 
about results but to also about costs. It is hence unsurprising that we find the cost effectiveness 
of the industry figuring prominently in the business’ self-promotion. In the US for example, 
BENS has produced a “Tail-to-Tooth” report suggesting that Pentagon’s defence budget could 
be halved if only the possibilities of outsourcing and privatizing in the sector were fully 
grasped.5 But also the firms themselves emphasise the cost-effectiveness of the services they of-
fer. Cost effectiveness and technical professionalism usually figure side by side in a way Chris 
Taylor (of Blackwater, another large US firm) nicely illustrates when he argues that: 
 
Send 10.000 UN troops to Darfur? A colossal waste of money. You do not create security 
and peace by throwing more mediocre, uncommitted people into the fray. 1000-2000 pro-
fessional contractors could perform those same stability operations, safely turning over 
the operation to the UN and other NGOs to perform post-conflict operations. That is what 
they do best (Taylor, 2005). 
 
 The next step is to think about whether it matters for security practices that the private 
security business competes by this combination of technical expertise and cost effectiveness. It is 
argued here that it does. Competition in the industry is ultimately about convincing clients that a 
firm is more efficient than its competitors. But perhaps even more importantly, it is about con-
vincing these potential clients that technically competent cost-effective security services is what 
they need in the first place. If that is not the case, it becomes irrelevant to know whether or not a 
firm is efficient and technically competent. If a potential client sees a problem above all as a 
socio-economic issue or as one best solved by negotiation, it makes little sense to promote tech-
                                                          
5 The full report is available on the net at www.BENS.org as are a variety of interpretations and policy statements 
related to it. 
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nical and cost effective security services: the kinds of solutions considered will involve diplo-
macy and foreign aid, not security provision. Similarly if a client’s key concern is limiting civil-
ian causalities or establishing long term ties with a rebel group, technical competence and cost 
effectiveness may be less important than diplomatic skills, public authority or long term rela-
tions. It therefore becomes essential for the private security business that problems are defined as 
security problems and that the technical competence and cost effectiveness are important consid-
erations when solutions are considered. We should therefore expect the industry self-promotion 
as well as the simple presence and growth of private contraction to refashion security practices in 
a direction where this is the case. There are at least two reasons this is occurring.  
 The first is that firms push their understanding of security practices onto their potential 
clients through direct lobbying. As in other normal business, security firms lobby both to reshape 
the regulatory environment and to promote specific contracts. Because of the centrality of states 
as regulators and as clients, lobbying is possibly even more central in the security sector than 
elsewhere. It is therefore not surprising to find constant reference to the close ties between firms 
and states (ICIJ, 2002b), a tendency perhaps epitomised by the much discussed links between 
Halliburton and vice president Cheney on which there is a flood of books and intense media cov-
erage (Didion, 2006). The significance of lobbying for this argument is not that it is more com-
mon and intense than in other sectors (I am not sure it is). Nor is it that lobbying is costly and/or 
potentially illegal. Rather, lobbying by the private security business is significant here because it 
is influences the framing problems. By lobbying private security firms frame problems as secu-
rity problems solvable with the help of affordable technical competent measures. They alter the 
balance of arguments surrounding the questions on which they lobby. This is true even when the 
lobbying does not result in a contract. Through the lobbying process itself, private security firms 
alter the agenda, the arguments and the understandings involved in judging security matters. To 
the extent that the security understandings are reshaped, so are security practices.  
Second, private security business are pulled into reshaping security practices: they are 
hired to do so. Private security firms are hired for training and consultancy. This may stand for 
something extremely narrow and technical as when a firm is hired to explain the general func-
tioning of an armament system which it will itself operate for the armed forces or when it is 
training those who will operate the system. It may also be slightly broader as for example when 
firms develop military training programmes and strategy. For example, Cubic trains the Geor-
gian armed forces (Paton Walsh, 2004). DynCorp offers consultancy to the Columbian armed 
forces (Bigwood, 2001). MPRI “develops and conducts instruction for the Army Force Man-
agement School and related courses” (www.mpri.com). A priori, these activities provide and 
communicate “technical” competencies in a narrow sense: how to use an arms system or how to 
develop an efficient military organization. However, these narrowly defined, technical train-
ing/consultancies play a significant role in shaping security practices. They involve the devel-
opment of schemes of analysis and understanding as well as of routine forms of action that effec-
tively give shape to security practices. Even narrowly defined security training works to make 
participants see problems as security problems and react to them accordingly.  
More than this, the private security business is hired to shape security practices more 
broadly. Part of what the private security business does is to provide intelligence as Digital 
Globe and Space Imaging have in Afghanistan or Titan and CACI in Abu Ghraib. But even more 
broadly, private security firms are often hired to shape views on general political issues. The 
MPRI runs the African Centre for Strategic Studies. DynCorp holds contracts on the national, 
provincial and municipal levels in Iraq to assess threats, train Iraqi police and military personnel 
 5
and to advice on the reorganization of the Iraqi justice system (Isenberg 2004). This type of ac-
tivity is designed to shape the general understandings of political, economic and social problems. 
Security concerns and efficiency are bound to figure prominently in their analysis. After all, the 
private security business is staffed by security professionals who are no less likely to be shaped 
by their professionalism than are professionals in other fields. If military sociology is right they 
are rather more likely than others because of the traditionally strict corporate rules of the profes-
sion. 
None of this produces an unequivocally monolithic view of security where technical 
competence and cost-effectiveness reign uncontested. Competing views exist and will continue 
to do so. However, the current political context amplifies the private security business’ impact on 
security practices. For one, the rapid expansion and heightened competition in the business pres-
sure firms to shape security practices more innovatively and more effectively. As an observer of 
the defence industry argues, “the leading defence company of the future will be primarily a ma-
nipulator of opinions, in a diversity of markets, rather than the familiar engineering enterprise of 
the past. Some companies are already becoming this” (Lovering 2000: p. 174). For two, since the 
early 1980s, an overall pro-private-business-and-market-solutions-mood has been the backdrop 
of politics everywhere (Shipman, 1998; Gill, 1995). This means that when the private security 
business makes inroads into security practices, it does so echoing privatization and outsourcing 
debates in other areas. It also benefits from the advance of privatization elsewhere. On balance 
therefore, private security providers have pushing in open doors. For these two reasons, private 
providers have had a stronger impact on security practices than one might otherwise have ex-
pected.  
This is born out by the changes in security practices. The self-representation of the pri-
vate security business as a business of technical experts selling cost-effective and essential ser-
vices is widely accepted. It is often considered “strategically effective”, flexible, and a depositor 
of privileged “local” and situational knowledge not only among observers but more significantly 
in policy-making circles (e.g. Whelan 2003). As persuasively shown by Markusen (2003), this 
translates as a positive bias for private security providers when these are compared with public 
ones. Evidence of inefficiency and incompetence is dismissed as exceptions to the rule (for no 
good reason) and basic information gathering procedures are simply ignored. The consequence is 
that private sector security expertise is increasingly relied on by the entire range of actors work-
ing in zones where security is a substantial issue, ranging from conservationist NGOs in national 
parks to states training their armed forces (Avant, 2005: chap. 5 and Howe, 2001 respectively). 
But even more significant is the extent to which the sector is employed for a range of activities 
with a tenuous and distant link to security narrowly defined. The business hence finds itself in-
volved in tasks for which it has no particular competence. For example it is or has been involved 
in reforming the justice system in Iraq (Isenberg, 2004), in negotiating peace accords in Sudan 
(Chatterjee, 2004) and explaining democracy in Croatia (Silverstein, 2000).  
To sum up, precisely because the business does what it keeps telling everyone it does –
namely provide cost effective professional security services – it has reshaped security practices. 
Through its direct lobbying, technical training and its provision of general advice on security 
policies, the private security business has brought NGOs, publics at large and security profes-
sionals think about security increasingly in terms of costs and technicalities. This shift towards 
and expansion of technico-managerial security practices becomes more significant by the fact 
that private business strives to keep aloof of political debates. 
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3. De-politicizing Security Practices by Not Meddling in Politics 
 
A second important impact of the private security business on security practices has been depo-
litization. The reason the rise of the sector has had that consequence is (as the firms keep saying) 
that the private security providers do not engage in political debates. This in turn has resulted in 
a displacement of security practices. They come to be located outside public political debate; 
they are de-politicized. This dislocation reinforces the technical and managerial nature of secu-
rity practices by effectively restricting the space for contesting both that understanding of secu-
rity and for advancing alternative (non security oriented) understandings and remedies to prob-
lems. 
 If there is one thing the private security business insists heavily on (besides its profes-
sionalism and efficiency) it is certainly that it is following the agendas of clients, it is answering 
a demand. It is shaping neither demand nor agenda. Firms do not do politics. They do not want to 
engage in debates about political priorities. Of course, no firm would deny that it may influence 
political outcomes. It is part of their technical efficiency to do so. Blackwater for example has an 
advertisement featuring “Bosnia, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Iraq” as header under 
which the firm proceeds to tell its potential clients “..those of us who enjoy freedom and democ-
racy are now bound to help share it with the world. Through selfless commitment and compas-
sion for all people, Blackwater works to make a difference...”(Advertisement in IPOA, 2005: 4). 
The “selflessness and compassion” is exercised for a legitimate cause and this legitimate cause is 
defined by politics, not by Blackwater itself. Most firms are keen to work for good causes. They 
are also willing to varying degrees to come out in public to underline their capacity to contribute 
to a given good cause including spreading democracy in Iraq, keeping peace in Afghanistan or 
capturing Charles Taylor (Rosenfeld, 2005; Oppel and Hart, 2004; Catán and Peel, 2003). How-
ever, firms (as they keep repeating) are not willing to engage in the public debate about which 
causes are good. Just as the military or the police see themselves as acting in continuation and 
accordance with politics, so does the private security business. 
There are crucial differences between private and public security providers, however, 
with important implications for what their respective resistance to engage in politics means for 
security practices. The key difference is that most countries have political procedures – admit-
tedly imperfect and ineffective to varying degrees – designed to control both how the (public) 
military and security forces engage in politics and to check way the executive uses force (Fisher, 
2005; DCAF, 2002). The exact nature of these political procedures varies with the context. But 
they tend to involve procedures subjecting executive and security professionals to wider political 
scrutiny. Illustrations of this include procedures requiring uses of force to be reported to parlia-
ment or perhaps even approved by it, restrictions on the amounts and kinds of military assistance 
can be exported without legislative approval, legislative committees to which the armed forces 
report and through which they can be heard and so on. This type of political check on the use of 
force exists to ensure a (potential) continuous political, non-security establishment involvement 
with the use of force. These processes in other words operate to trigger public discussion when 
force is used about whether or not a use of military/policing is the best solution or whether there 
are other more appropriate alternatives. In this debate the military/security establishment is but 
one voice of many. 
For the private military business the logic is different. The safeguards that exist for public 
military involvement are mostly either inapplicable or ineffective (Leander, 2007 forthcoming). 
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Political controls of the use of force focus on the use of force by public security professionals. 
This makes historical sense. The outlawing of mercenarism means that private business has 
played a limited role in the use of force internationally and when it has played a role it has been 
under the auspices of public armed forces. Logically, therefore the political checks on private 
security that do exist typically cover the areas where private firms have a traditional open and 
legitimate involvement (arms exports, logistics) but leave out other areas and anything resem-
bling military operations as it is assumed that this is a public monopoly. This may makes histori-
cal sense but it is nonetheless inadequate in the face of the current expansion of private security 
where the Rubicon separating public troops engaging in combat from private contractors that do 
not has long since been crossed (Guillory, 2001; Zamparelli, 1999). Moreover, since using pri-
vate business is a conventional way of circumventing political control, there is reason to believe 
that a weak control over the private security business is both widespread and intentional (Bigo 
2004). The weakness of political control over the private security business has the consequence 
that the political debate ensured (at least potentially) by political controls when the public mili-
tary is involved is correspondingly weakened or absent when it comes to the private security 
business. 
In such a context, the security business’ unwillingness to engage in politics comes to 
mean something very different from the public military’s unwillingness to engage in political 
debate. It may be presented – and thought of – as expressing a wish to leave politics to sort out 
political priorities. The implication, however, is that the discussion about political priorities and 
politics as such tends to be displaced and to disappear from sight. Since the political safe-guards 
are inoperable, the discussions and decisions about why, when and how to use force are located 
within the security establishment. Those directly involved in security operations discuss among 
themselves whether or not given contracts and engagements are acceptable and legal or not. De-
cisions are displaced from a public political process to a narrow technocratic one. From a discus-
sion involving the entire spectrum of stake holders, ranging from the legislative branch (also op-
position politicians), the media, interest group organizations, a broader public we move to a far 
narrower one. In effect, the debate over which issues are security issues and who is to deal with 
them becomes one involving mainly security professionals from the armed forces/police, minis-
tries of defence and possibly the executive branch. The implication is that the voice of those who 
would like to define a problem as something else than a security problem, and to look for non 
military/policing technical solutions to it, is marginalised if heard at all. When alternative views 
are not heard, they are unlikely to be adopted. In this context staying aloof of politics by not en-
gaging in public political debate is a matter of marginalizing debate outside the security estab-
lishment, of moving the problem definition out of politics, i.e. of effectively de-politicizing secu-
rity. 
This de-politicization of security has two immediate consequences for security practices. 
First, it tends to make money a (if not the) key criterion for whose security concerns are dealt 
with. Indeed, as political debate about the use of force is displaced, money moves in as pivotal 
for the decisions of which clients and causes deserve to have firms working for them. Indeed, 
although all established larger firms in the private security business make a point out of working 
exclusively for legitimate clients it is important to realise two things (e.g. Spicer 1999). First, the 
legitimate clients for which the firms work (obviously) also have to be clients capable of paying 
for the services. This means that would be legitimate clients with no capacity to pay will not get 
services from private companies. While cash rich researchers, NGOs, international organiza-
tions, corporations, and governments will be able to buy security services, cash-starved political 
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movements, ordinary citizens, refugees and children are not. It is from this perspective that ob-
servers of politics in Africa worry about the return of neo-colonial proxy wars where rich 
firms/individuals/rulers can fight out their disagreements with the help of private proxy armies 
(Musah 2002). Less drastically put, it certainly is the case that a Swiss cheese security coverage, 
where the wholes are made by financial weakness, is a correlate of making money rather than 
politics decisive in matters of security. 
Second, de-politicization has altered security practices with regard to the tricky question 
of regulating who should be allowed to buy security services. Instead of having the issue settled 
by political considerations primarily, decision is left to the markets i.e. to firms who need con-
tracts and customers. It is important to underline that what is a “legitimate” client is always a 
matter of interpretation and subject to intense contestation. Who is the legitimate ruler is a – if 
not the – key issue at stake in contemporary armed conflicts (Holsti 1996). Moreover, as eco-
nomic considerations become significant, traditional evaluations of legitimacy may be reversed. 
For example, MPRI convinced the US to reconsider it policy towards Equatorial Guinea (allied 
with Cuba and North Korea). The firm successfully argued that it should be allowed to take on a 
contract with the country since otherwise a French firm would. By its own description MPRI is 
now assisting the country with the development of a National Security Enhancement Plan with 
“an integrated team of defense, security, and Coast Guard experts to provide a detailed set of rec-
ommendations to the government of Equatorial Guinea concerning its defence, littoral, and re-
lated environmental management requirements, as well as detailed implementation processes” 
(www.mpri.com). This engagement would have been unlikely if a political discussion had taken 
place. The extent to which the replacement of politics by money has affected security practices is 
expressed most starkly in the virtual absence of effective limits on clients. Even clients almost 
everyone would concede are illegitimate will find it possible to persuade some firm to sell them 
military services. A drug cartel in Cali e.g. paid USD 10 million to obtain the material and exper-
tise necessary to bomb their rival Pablo Escobar in the early 1990s (Kouri 2005).  
Third and finally, depoliticization – via the growing uncertainty about clients – has re-
sulted in security practices increasingly caught by a traditional security dilemma. The “security 
dilemma” refers to the dilemma of having to prepare for war (building up armed forces e.g.) even 
though doing so increases the insecurity of the opponent and hence the likelihood of war. The 
security dilemma is anchored in perceptions of what might happen rather than what really does. 
The imagined capacity of opponents of various kinds to buy security services on the private mar-
ket is sufficient to justify further militarization and expenditure of defense which in turn deepens 
the traditional security dilemma. An episode from Ghana in 2004 exemplifies this dynamic 
(Addo 2004): On 13 August 2004 The Analyst (a Liberian news paper) carries a story about Gha-
nian opposition leaders massively recruiting mercenaries in the Ivory Coast, Togo, Senegal and 
Guinea to attack Ghana. President Adullah Wade (of Senegal) and a former national security 
boss of Ghana, Kojo Tsikata, are said to be implicated. The story is carried in the Ghanian papers 
Statesman (August 19) and Insight (August 27-29). The Accra Daily Mail claims to have re-
ceived information about mercenaries planning to strike from Ivory Coast (August 23). Ministry 
of the Interior confirms that “some people with links to the opposition” are moving along the 
border regions Ivory Coast and Guinea. The president issues a call for security agencies to be 
vigilant (26 August). This is where the story ends. It turns out to be a hoax and The Analyst pre-
sents public excuses. However, the episode bolstered the Ghanaian security establishment and its 
demand for better resources; the story showed what could have happened and might still happen. 
For this article, it illustrates the point that even if private security firms do not actually sell ser-
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vices to an opponent, the suspicion that they might is sufficient to deepen traditional security di-
lemmas. 
The insistence of the private security business that it is not engaging in politics is hence a 
claim that should be treated seriously. The private security business prefers not to engage in pub-
lic political debates about which issues are security issues and how political priorities should be 
structured. The implication is a de-politicization of security practices. Money becomes essential 
in deciding which problems are a security problem, how they should be dealt with and to whose 
advantage. The consequence is Swiss cheese security coverage and accentuated security dilem-
mas. This process of de-politicization further marginalises the alternatives to techno-managerial 
security understandings that are already effectively out-competed by the technical efficiency of 
the private security business. To grasp the full significance of these changes security practices it 
is important to consider how it relates to the public sector and the state more specifically. 
 
 
4. Serving States’ Militarized Security Practices 
 
The full effect of private security providers on security practices becomes clear only if one looks 
at the close links between the sector and states and the extent to which also states’ security prac-
tices have evolved as a consequence of the rise of the private security business. As already ar-
gued in the pages of this journal (Porter 2005), it is generally highly misleading to think of pub-
lic and private power in zero sum terms, where gains in state power mirror losses in firm power 
and vice versa. In Porter’s argument they develop in parallel as part of relatively autonomous 
functional sub-systems. In this account they support and re-shape each other. To grasp this it is 
useful to listen to what the private security business says about itself. In particular it is useful to 
take its insistence that it works with states and not against them more seriously. 
The private security industry is closely intertwined with states. The business itself has 
been created by the willingness of states to diminish direct control over security affairs and to 
allow increased outsourcing and privatization. States continue to shape the market but at the 
same time they resist regulation attempts (Hulse, 2004). States continue to be among the key cli-
ents of security firms, even if one should not underrate the significance of private business, in-
ternational organizations, NGOs and assorted individuals. States, finally, are directly involved in 
the business. Many firms originated and continue to operate as (para-) public firms, sometimes 
partially owned by the state. It is common also for entirely private firms to appoint high-ranking 
politicians and administrators to their boards and as directors (ICIJ, 2002a). Finally, firms have 
close links to the armed forces. EO was linked to the South African Buffalo Battalion, MPRI is 
linked to the US armed forces, Sandline and its successors/ spin-offs are linked to the UK special 
services. But even firms that recruit from a variety of countries (e.g. Erinys and Aegis) will have 
an overwhelming majority of their employees with origins in (various) national defence estab-
lishments. Everyone in the industry is an ex-something from the public armed forces. 
As this indicates, it is not meaningful to assume a zero-sum relationship between states 
and the private security business. The relations between the two are more complex. Some parts 
of “states” encourage, work for and benefit from the development of the private security business 
and inversely the private security business is closely linked to (some parts of) the state. The rele-
vant question in the context is this article is what implications this has for security practices. I 
will suggest here that the key to answering is to probe how the blurring boundaries shifts power 
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positions inside states and through this, who weighs on and gives shape to state security prac-
tices. 
Two different groups within states are empowered by the private security business. The 
first of these includes those who benefit directly or indirectly from private security business. Just 
as we talk about “dual use technology” moving between the civilian and military spheres, we can 
think of individuals who do the same, dual sphere individuals. Staff and directors, board mem-
bers and technicians of private security companies frequently also hold a position in the state in-
stitutions including the armed forces, the government or an administration. These persons in-
clude the generals on the lists of MPRI ready to take on a temporary contract with the firm. It 
also includes politicians who are closely tied to firms such as Frank Carlucci (defence secretary 
under Regan) who served as a board director at Vinell (ICIJ, 2002b: 3), or those involved indi-
rectly with the industry through more or less elaborate systems of economic kick-backs as has 
come out in the European “Augusta”, “Flick”, or Elf-Acquitaine scandals which all have in 
common that they unveiled complex systems of party finance involving large military contrac-
tors (Joly, 2003). The point here is that growth of the private security business bolsters the posi-
tion of these dual sphere individuals. Their intermediation becomes more important both for the 
state and for the business and the rewards they can expect grow correspondingly. With the ex-
pansion of the private security business, dual sphere individuals gain not only economically but 
also in terms of status and centrality for policy-making. Since the private security business is 
“their” business in a very direct way, they can also be expected to work to promote it actively 
within the state. The term “business politician” describes a specific type of politician that was 
developing because of the growing closeness of business and politics in Italy (della Porta and 
Pizzorno, 1996). I am arguing here that one sub-category of the business politician, the “security 
business politician” is becoming an increasingly common and increasingly prominent figure as a 
consequence of the expansion of the private military sector. 
The second group empowered by the emergence of the private security business com-
prises those who share the private security business’ understanding of security and politics more 
widely without being linked to it. This group share with the private security industry a tendency 
to expand the number of issues that are thought of as security issues and to seek technical rather 
than political/diplomatic solutions to problems that arise. There is a long tradition for thinking 
that these views are particularly prevalent among security professionals whose professionalism 
make them focus their attention on the technical aspects of security (Janowitz, 1971). There is an 
equally longstanding tradition for worrying about the “military adventurism” of politicians with 
exaggerated beliefs about what can be achieved through a technical competent and effective use 
of force (Desch, 1999). Both of these groups are susceptible of being strengthened by the rise of 
the private security industry. They share the private business understanding of security issues 
and, more tangibly, the industry makes it feasible to expand and extend strategies where the use 
of force plays a central role. One would consequently expect, to see a reshuffling of the weight 
of different institutions within states expressed by intense competition and disagreement. In the 
US this expectation is currently born out as there is considerable disagreement between the De-
partment of Defence and the State Department regarding how to deal with the private sector and 
how much to regulate it (GAO 2005). 
This bolstering of those who share the private business’ technical and managerial ap-
proach affects states’ security practices. It amounts to giving the persons and individuals most 
prone to have a techno-managerial understanding of security an increased say over how the secu-
rity. Since this understanding is centred on technical solutions, emphasising cost saving it tends 
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to limit the scope for contestation. The consequence is a militarization of security practices in a 
classical sense.6 Ultimately of course the worry is that one could end up in what Harold Laswell 
termed a “Garrison State” where “crisis accentuation of state power tends to subordinate all so-
cial values and institution to considerations of military potential, and how as a result military and 
police specialists are placed in advantageous positions, within the decision process” (Laswell, 
1997: 102). 
On the basis of the argument made here, however, there is no foundation for arguing that 
any particular state has turned into a “garrison state” or that states in general have. The point 
here is more modestly that the development of the private security business logically drives state 
security practices in this direction even if the significance of this drive is far from uniform. The 
security business politician as well as of the reshuffling of security institutions is bound to vary 
considerably across contexts. This is so because national security cultures vary (Katzenstein, 
1996) enormously with the dual consequence that privatization has been uneven and that it has 
been dealt with in diverging ways. For example, in post-second world war German security 
thinking the defence forces are a school of the nation and fear that they could escape control is 
deeply rooted. As a consequence privatization and outsourcing in the security sector has re-
mained relatively limited compared e.g. to the situation in the UK. But more than this, the post-
second world war forces have made the primacy of policy and diplomatic alternatives as well as 
the individual soldier’s duty to resist unjust orders part and parcel of their training (Longhurst, 
2004). In such a context, a development of security business politicians and extensive reshuffling 
of positions is unlikely. The development of the private security business is more limited and it 
is more difficult to turn into an advantage for those who would share and benefit from a techni-
cal-managerial understanding of security. Similarly, the strongly statist French armed forces are 
prone to be more suspicious of private business involvement than are the more liberal UK ones 
(Sénat, 2000L; Lanxade, 2001). Again this restricts the extent of privatization and outsourcing 
and more centrally limits its imprint on state security practices. 
The emphasis on variability should not be exaggerated. It is far easier to underestimate 
the effects of the rise of the private security business on the security practices of states officially 
resisting privatization than to overestimate it. The restructuring of the security industry world 
wide and the intense competition for market shares that this has engendered, affects also those 
states least prone to privatize and outsource (Kaldor, 1998). An increasing number of standards 
and security priorities are established beyond the state either through markets or regulatory agen-
cies where private firms have an increasing. For example, at the EU the security services offered 
by UK companies put pressure on German and French firms to compete and on the governments 
to create the frames allowing this competition. Similarly, the BISP is pushing for the develop-
ment of regulatory standards bound to reshape also French and German policies on the sector. In 
addition to this, private companies have a part in virtually all multilateral operations. “You could 
fight without us but it would be difficult” is Paul Lomardi’s judgement (2003).7 This means that 
also states that do not on encourage privatization and outsourcing have working relations with 
the business to the extent that they participate in these operations. Last but not least, political de-
bates about security are not nationally bounded. They engage international media, international 
institutions, foreign governments and translational civil society groups. Isolating security prac-
                                                          
6 Militarization is “the permeation of an entire society by the self-serving ideology of the officer and soldier” 
(Lasswell, 1997: 107). 
7 Lombardi is a former CEO of Dyncorp. 
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tices in any one state from the effects of the rise of the private security industry is consequently 
an elusive quest. 
The private security business is not deceiving when it claims that it works for states and 
does in no way want undermine them. More accurately the private security business empowers 
specific groups within states, namely the groups that either benefit directly from its existence or 
the groups that share its overall world view and priorities for a variety reasons. These groups 
have played a significant part in the industry’s expansion by promoting it inside states. More 
generally, their empowerment and their presence in states reinforce the technocratization and de-
politicization of security that is a consequence of the expansion of the industry. The blurred pri-
vate/public boundary, the fact that the industry does not work against states but with, for and 
through them is not a sign of the insignificance of the private security business. It is constitutive 
of its success and of its impact on security understandings. 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
In a recent article on power Steven Lukes argues that the key to understanding the relative power 
of different agents over different issues is to look at the significance of the outcomes they can 
bring about: “I will have more power than you if I can bring about more ‘significant’ outcomes 
than those you can bring about” he argues (Lukes, 2005: p. 481). If we accept this understanding 
of power there can be little doubt that the private security business is powerful: it has reshaped 
security practices. The business has made security practices more technocratic and managerial. It 
has de-politicized them by reducing the role and scope for political contestation. And it has al-
tered security practices of all actors including of states. The private security business has in other 
words altered who decides what a security problem is, how it will be dealt with by whom and on 
what conditions. It has increased the range of security problems dealt with by the use of force. It 
has decreased the scope for politically contesting this development and for financially weak 
groups to claim security coverage. This paper has centred on the mechanisms by which these in-
deed very significant outcomes have come about.  
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